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Pastor  (1997).  A similar
study was carried out by
Barr, Seiford and Siems
(1993). Siems and Barr
(1998) extended the work by
benchmarking efficiency
throughout the United
States.  The ground-
breaking work by Aly et al.
(1990) showed how to
extend DEA to establish the
nature of returns to scale,
and then applied the
method to the U.S. banking
industry. 
An early application in
the life insurance industry
was that of Cummins and Zi
(1998). They used the ability
of DEA to provide an
efficient frontier to compare
the various firms. This was
followed by the Cummins,
Weiss, and Zi (1999) article
that used DEA to compare
and contrast stock and
mutual property–casualty
insurers. Ellis (2006) used
DEA to show the consistent
level of operational efficiency
over time for a particular
auto insurer. That work
presented an innovation
that created a single
efficient DMU from which all
existing entities can be
compared. Doing so avoids
the possibility that any
relatively inefficient entities
would be compared to
differing efficient subsets.
Ellis (2006-2007) also
employed DEA with the
single efficient DMU to track
banking industry efficiency
over time.
U.S. Property–
Casualty Insurance
Data
A DEA study requires
comparing competing
entities based upon the
levels of a set of inputs that
are used for the purpose of
generating a set of outputs.
The data was collected from
Best’s Aggregates and
Averages (2006). This
volume contains complete
financial and operational
results for the firms and
aggregates of the U.S.
property–casualty industry.
The industry is segmented
into 19 composites (Listing
1). Operating results from
2005 were used. The
composites were compared
based upon several input
and output variables. The
input variables include the
lagged values of bond
holdings (BOND1), common
stock holdings (CS1), cash
(CASH1) and policyholder
surplus (PHS1). Also
included are the concurrent
levels of incurred losses
(LOSSINC), incurred loss
adjustment expenses
(LAEINCR), underwriting
expenses paid (UNDEXPD)
and loss payments (LOSS).
The output variables are
underwriting profit or loss
(UNDPL) and net invest-
ment income (NII).
Solvency requires
sufficient liquidity to cover
losses and a sufficient
capital base upon which
policies may be written.
Bonds are typically the
principal asset because they
have liquidity and are safer
than common stocks.
Stocks remain an important
asset holding because they
are also quite liquid and
usually have a greater
potential for capital
appreciation.  Policyholder
surplus is the industry
name for paid—in capital,
capital reserves and
retained earnings. It is the
chief limitation upon
underwriting ability. State
regulators do not permit
large premium writing based
upon a small capital
structure. The restriction is
usually given to be that net
premiums written cannot
exceed three times the level
of policyholder surplus. The
bond, common stock and
policyholder surplus
holdings are lagged because
they are necessary
limitations upon the ability
to write new business
during the year. That is, the
insurers know that these
beginning values are
available for underwriting
and investment activities
throughout the year. The
several concurrent input
variables are selected
because they indicate the
level of success in managing
the insurance enterprise.
Losses incurred and loss
payments might be limited
through selective risk
acceptance. Loss
adjustment expenses are
those incurred while 
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The form and means of
corporate earnings
management (CEM) have
evolved and become ever
more sophisticated; how-
ever, in substance, CEM
remains the misinforming of
the users of an organiza-
tion’s financial statements,
via the strategic abuse of
timing, reorganizing,
reclassifying, and/or
omitting of material
information. Thus, even
though CEM rarely involves
outright deception, it is a
fundamental breach of
trust. As such, CEM is
immensely damaging to the
primary role of financial
statements (i.e., the creation
and/or maintenance of
informed trust between
organizations and their key
stakeholders).
This study is structured
as follows. After discussing
the importance of CEM, this
article elaborates on the
definitions, key concepts in
the CEM literature with a
focus on CEM evolution,
incentives, and motiva-
tions. The discussion also
includes the important
proximal causes of CEM and
the flow-on effects of CEM;
for example, the short-term
survival needs of firms
during economic downturns
likely increases their
incentive to engage in CEM
(Healy & Wahlen, 1999). In
counter-point, domestic and
international business
partners are aware that the
bad acts of their managers
(such as CEM) may have
contagion or spill-over
implications for their
suppliers, customers,
creditors, auditors, financial
analysts, etc. Compounding
the current mix of diffi-
culties and complexities of
the global economy is the
rise of protectionism; as
evidenced by the ongoing
difficulties in recent World
Trade Organization
discussions.1 Finally, the
balance of the study follows
a description of the
specifications of various
CEM models, listing each
model’s strengths and
weaknesses, along with
conclusions and suggestions
for future research.
Uncertainty in the global
economic and finance
markets in 2008 and 2009
(e.g., a global credit crisis
compounded by rollercoaster
volatility in interest rates,
consumer prices, and prices
of commodities, food-stuffs,
and oil) heightened the
importance of the corporate
sector’s need to show its
survivability via solid
profitability, competitive-
ness, market share, and
access to inputs. Bourgeois
(1985) commented on
strategic goals and economic
performance in volatile
environments. Research on
the reality of how per-
formance is communicated
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to stakeholders has
addressed such important
concepts as
• Are the agency problem
and its cost important?
• Does manager wrong-
doing cause lasting harm
to investor relations and
financial public relations?
• Have the CEM issues
been satisfactorily
recognized and
addressed?
• What are the future
directions left for
researchers to focus on?
This descriptive study
examines the development
of extant CEM literature
over last few decades, with
the intent of identifying
trends by tracking dominant
issues, thinking, views,
motivation, and activities in
CEM. This imposition of
order on the large and
rapidly expanding volume of
CEM research is a prerequ-
isite to gathering the trends
in CEM under-standing into
an underlying theory of
CEM. This CEM-research
taxonomy should provide
insight on the current and
potential direction of the
expanding volume and
variety of CEM incidents
and help regularity bodies in
their efforts to tighten and
improve reporting standards
and regulations.
The Importance of CEM
The importance of
research on CEM arises
because earnings on
financial statements are a
vital input into resource-
allocation decisions.
Consistent with this
importance, business ethics
and agency issues2 are
among the most frequently
investigated issues in
financial management and
accounting. The potential of
managers to use CEM to
gain wealth, recognition,
and/or other benefits at a
potentially unfair cost to
stakeholders has long been
a worry of governments,
private sector regulators,
investors, practitioners,
analysts and researchers;
however, the nature, extent,
motivation for and
consequences of CEM have
been formally investigated
and modeled in CEM
empirical literature, only in
the last few decades
(Coughlan & Schmidt, 1985;
MacNichols & Wilson, 1988;
Natarajan, 1999).
The systematic study of
CEM practices by managers
has evolved into a dynamic
and rapidly growing body of
empirical literature
(McNichols, 2000; Beneish,
2001; Watts & Zimmerman,
1990). Using agency theory
and the associated
assumption of managerial
opportunism Watts and
Zimmerman (1978) sought
to identify, explain, and
predict the circumstances
under which managers are 
most likely to manipulate
earnings (Dechow, Sloan, &
Sweeney, 1995, 1996) and
found that CEM can be very
pervasive, under certain
conditions. The misleading
perceptions of value arising
from CEM has the potential
to significantly misallocate
resources, in both domestic
and international
economies—e.g., Kellogg
and Kellogg (1991) and
Dechow et al. (1996) noted
that firms who engaged in
CEM had significantly
higher costs of capital.
 While fraud, misman-
agement of funds and
misleading information are
not new to the corporate
sector, more and more
companies are being
accused of unethical
behavior (e.g., HIH Australia
in 2001, Procter & Gamble
in 1985, Worldcom in 2002,
Enron and Arthur Anderson
in 2002),3 are only a fraction
of the many large formerly
well-respected firms that
have had regulators
investigate their behavior.4
Despite the difficulties of
ascertaining the accounting
devices used in CEM to
enhance compensation,
raise capital, avoid covenant
default, or influence
regulatory outcomes
(Beneish, 2001), many
attempts have been made to
definitively identify and
describe their nature. While
past and current empirical
findings on CEM are often
derived from samples of
large U.S. firms, there is an 
awareness of the economies
of other nations (Boonyanet
& Julavittayanukool, 2008
(for Thailand); Inoue and
Thomas, 1996; Herrmannm
et al., 2003; Watabe, 2008
(for Japan); Habib, 2005 (for
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Bangladesh); Singh, 2008
(for Fiji), etc.). While the
form and methods of CEM
have evolved over time and
become ever more
sophisticated, the substance
of CEM remains in a twisted
grey area between truth and
an outright lie. One CEM
fundamental remains
unchanged; its intent is a
search for an unfair
advantage from financial
statement users. Further,
CEM truth-twisting usually
involves timing,
reclassifying, omission
and/or exaggeration of
financial information.
Definition, Evolution,
Incentives, and
Motives in CEM
Since the 1980’s, many
studies on the concept of
CEM have defined it in a
variety of ways. This lack of
a general agreement on the
definition of CEM may be
due to differing interpreta-
tions of empirical evidence.
Beneish (2001), for example,
lists three very different
definitions, to illustrate the
lack of a consensus
definition of CEM:
1. Per Beniesh (2001 pp.
4) “Earnings manage-
ment is the process of
using specific steps
within Generally
Accepted Accounting
Principles (GAAP) to be
able to bring about the
wanted [but not neces-
sarily true and fair] level
of reported earnings.”
2. Earnings management
is an intervention used
to obtain personal gain
through the external
financial reporting
process (Beneish, 2001;
Schipper, 1989), and
3. Earnings management
is a process whereby
managers use their
discretion to determine
final outcomes in
financial reports to
enhance the reported
underlying economic
performance of a
company or influence
contractual outcomes
(Healy & Wahlen, 1999),
by magnifying the
signal in reported
earnings.
The above examples of
the many definitions used to
describe CEM, all have in
common the underlying fact
that all are actions taken by
management to maneuver
financial information so as
to gain benefit at an unfair
cost to stakeholders. As
such, these example
definitions demonstrate the
existence of an agency
problem between managers
and the stakeholders
(including non-manager
owners).
The Evolution of CEM
The central theme of
research on CEM as 
financial reporting
phenomena has evolved.
Specifically, in the1970s
and early 1980s, investiga-
tions on accounting choice
determinants suggested that
managers altered earnings
reports for their own benefit
and that their choice of
means depended on
regulatory and con-tractual
incentives (Holthausen &
Leftwich, 1983; Watts &
Zimmerman, 1986, Bowen
et al., 1995). After the mid-
1980s, accruals became a
fertile focus in the study of
CEM because
1. The use of accruals is a
generally accepted
accounting practice,
2. Accruals are used to
create true and fair
financial statement by
allocating revenues and
costs to their
appropriate period, and 
3. If the reasoning behind
an accrual is obscure, a
CEM component can
grafted on in such a
way as to make it likely
that investors will be
unable to determine the
effect of that CEM
component on reported
earnings (Beneish,
2001).
The CEM research
themes are still evolving
and, as the next subsection
notes, current research
tends to be focused more on
the ends (incentive and
motivation) of CEM than on
its means.
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CEM Incentives and
Motivations
Chan et el., (2006),
DeGeorge et al., (1999) and
Burgstahler and Dichev
(1997) suggest that changes
in the means and methods
of CEM in different eras flow
with changes in how the
different aspects of reported
earnings are managed in
those eras. In the 1990’s,
CEM literature gained
importance, as the volume
of CEM increased
exponentially. Specifically,
insider trading, a newly
researched CEM
determinant a decade
earlier, became a prominent
explanation for CEM. In the
late 1990s, researchers
began to focus on the
penalties faced by managers
after earnings
manipulations are
discovered. In the early 21st
Century, accounting
standards have become the
main focus of regulatory
bodies and CEM researches
are focusing on how the
theoretical foundations of
earnings management can
be used to strengthen the
use of mandatory disclosure
regulations to enhance
manager awareness of the
risks and the personal
consequences of fraudulent
behavior (Gelinas, 2007).
A three-way information-
asymmetry gradient has
been found between the
managers and the
controlling and non-
controlling investors
(Beneish, 2001); particularly
at the time of initial public
offerings (IPOs). Leland and
Pyle (1977) argue that
prospects for value growth
can be inferred from the
relative amount of equity
retained by insiders. As a
result, a main CEM research
focus of regulatory bodies,
in the past two decades, has
been on equity- and/or
insider-trading. Others
highlight the importance
and role of auditor
reputation on the offer price
(Datar et al., 1991).
Researchers have also
studied the importance of
earnings management in the
context of IPOS and other
research has looked at this
area in the context of
seasoned equity offerings.
Lin et al. (2008),
investigating the effect of the
structure of compensation
committees on CEM and
executive (CEO)
compensation incentives,
found strong evidence that
seasoned, equity-offering
firms engaged in positive
earnings management, to
finance additional capital
(Rangan, 1998;
Shivakumar, 2000). They
also found that CEOs
exercise stock options to
gain profits around
seasoned equity offerings,
when their stock prices are
higher.
Earlier research (e.g.,
Teoh et al., 1998) suggests
that a returns performance
enhanced with CEM will
tend to be negatively
correlated with subsequent
earnings (particularly if
CEM occurred at the time of
a major share issue).
However, research indicates
that market participants do
not fully incorporate the
implications of unexpected
accruals in their valuations.
Thus, it is likely
inappropriate to assert that
intentional CEM at the time
of a security issuance can
be wholly successful in
misleading investors
(Beneish, 2001).
Insider trading is a
relatively new means for
managers to capture the
gains from their CEM
exercises. Beneish (1999
and 2001, p. 10) noted that
“…managers of firms with
earnings overstatements
that violate GAAP are more
likely to sell their stock
appreciation…” Also, his
hypothesis was based on
previous insider trading
research, where he
examined the issue of
manipulation incentives
that are related to insider
trading. It was found that
many managers consider
the provision of timely
insider-information to
investors to be acceptable
and that they (the
managers) should be
rewarded for giving this
service (i.e., by being able to
profit from trading on that
insider information).
Current research suggests
that, if the penalties
imposed on managers
engaging in and/or
facilitating insider trading
are not significant, they will
be seen as more of a tax on
CEM than a deterrent. It
was found, that the U.S.
Securities Exchange
Commission (SEC) was less
34 Winter 2010 Southern Business Review
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likely to impose penalties on
managers in firms with
earnings overstatement if
those managers had not
sold their shares, as part of
a firm security offering.
Debt Contracts and
related compensation
agreements have also been
considered in accounting
research on CEM. However,
the varied results of studies
on economic consequences
have encouraged many
researchers to shift their
research focus to the
accounting choices being
made by firms that
experienced technical
default. Although the results
of such studies are mixed,
with regard to whether
managers make accounting
choices to increase income,
researchers argue that
managers are more likely to
make choices that avoid
covenant default. In related
studies, research suggests
that managers are more
likely to alter reported
earnings to increase
compensation and the
findings show that
managers are more likely to
report a decrease in
earnings to increase future
compensation (Healy, 1985);
however, other researchers
argue that the result
obtained by Healy (1985)
can be attributed to a
skewed experimental design
(Holthausen, 1995).
The perception and
importance of CEM
associated with a change in
CEO, has varied over the
last few decades. Incentives
to manipulate earnings prior
to and after change in CEO
and also contrasting those
with routing and non-
routing CEO changes, were
heavily investigated. During
the 1980s, CEO changes in
U.S. firms were clearly
linked with poor
performance. Coughlan and
Schmidt (1985); Warner et
al., (1988); and Weisbach
(1988) found incentives for
incumbent CEOs to engage
in CEM existed if they were
concerned with being
bumped, thus poor
performance has been
linked with CEO tenure or
other horizon issues, such
as planned retirement.
Dechow and Sloan (1991)
suggested that CEO
management of current
period income is done at a
cost to future income
streams and that some of
their decisions have real-
world negative impacts, as
opposed to mere shifting
between periods.
DeAngelo (1988), Strong
and Meyer (1987), Francis et
al., (1996), and Cotter et al.,
(1998), found evidence of
CEM by incoming CEOs, via
such things as write-downs
to form secrete reserves that
will enhance future reported
earnings. Dechow and Sloan
(1991) and Murphy and
Zimmerman (1993), linked
decision in accounting-
policy choices and real-
investment with CEO
changes. Pourciau (1993), in
focusing on non-routing
CEO changes using U.S.
based data, found that the
motivations for income
manipulation differ
depending on the
circumstances of the CEO
change. Healy (1985)
showed that the relatively
smaller bonuses of
Australian CEOs reduced
their incentive for CEM.
Wells (2002) in extending
prior work (that mainly
focused on U.S. market)
included the Australian
market and changed the
mechanical classification
method (from a focus on
announcements at the time
of the CEO change or
succession process) and
found the prior research
findings were still applicable
to Australian firms.
Specifically, even though
formal compensation
payments are not used in
Australia, implicit incentives
to manipulate income still
exist because the past
performance is reflected in
compensation generally.
 Job-security
performance is a significant
motivating factor to alter or
smooth earnings, so as to
support current and
perceived future
performance. This
conclusion is based on the
assumption that poor
performance can cause job
or status loss and that
satisfactory performance in
the current year does not
make up for previous poor
performance. Therefore, it is
argued that managers have
reason to use accounting
tools to increase
discretionary accruals
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during the period in
question. It is further
argued that managers make
their accounting choices
based around current and
expected future per-
formance. Fudenberg and
Torole (1995) suggest that
because incumbency rents
accrue to managers, poor
performance may result in
dismissal, and current
earnings bear more weight
than future earnings,
managers have significant
incentive to shift earnings to
enhance performance and to
make accounting choices to
support their decisions
and/or to create reporting
flexibility for future periods.
These incentives can
cause one of two equal but
opposite outcomes: 1) if
current earnings are low
and perceived future
earnings are high, managers
may choose an accounting
method that will increase
discretionary accruals in
that period (i.e., borrowing
from future earnings); 2) if
current earnings are high,
but expected earnings in the
future are low, managers
may use methods to
decrease the current- year
discretionary accruals (i.e.,
saving current earnings in a
secret reserve, for use in the
future).
Previous research
suggests that current
performance is a deciding
factor, when managers
choose to smooth earnings.
However, expectations may
make future performance
sufficient important for
managers to create hidden
reserves and engage in other
income smoothing tactics.
Expectations of competitor
behavior may also be
important determinant of
CEM, for example: earnings
management may be more
likely, if it is expected that
competitors will manage
earnings (Bagnoli & Watts,
2000). 
Some researchers have
argued that the incentive for
income smoothing lies in the
need for job security as
performance is measured by
both current and future
performance; e.g., good
performance leads to future
job security and bad
performance to possible
dismissal (Defond & Park,
1997). It is argued that
managers base their
decision for income
smoothing around their
performance; that is, if a
firm’s future performance is
expected to be poor, the
manager shifts current
earnings to future earnings
in order to reduce the
possibility of dismissal. In
other words, managers may
seek to borrow from future
earnings to enhance today’s
reported performance. The
opposite choice will be made
if current earnings are high
but expected future
earnings are low (Defond &
Park, 1997). In other words
some managers save current
earnings against the
possibility of poor perform-
ance in the future. Other
managers, recognizing that
profits cannot rise forever,
create periodic bad years
that are followed by a
succession of good years.
Above-normal gains on
stocks in efficient markets
are theoretically impossible
and such gains require a
performance surprise or
other anomalies. Further,
when stock markets are
undergoing rapid growth,
investors tend to be highly
reliant on analyst forecasts,
for portfolio selections.
These propositions have
encouraged researches over
the past decade, to search
for a relationship between
share prices and the
management of earnings
forecasts that enhance the
opportunity for performance
surprises. Bernhardt and
Campello (2007), examining
the relationship between
managed analyst forecast
and the associated value
consequences to firms,
found a value premium for
firms exceeding their
forecast earnings. Not
surprisingly, they also found
earnings forecasts to be
increasingly pessimistic over
the forecast horizon;
suggesting that firms may
have been seeking to
increase the opportunity for
pleasantly surprising the
market. Thus, the reward of
positive earnings-surprises
may be encouraging some
managers to engage in the
management of earnings
expectations rather either
creating real earnings or the
less sophisticated use CEM.
They also found that firms
that were able to manage
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the consensus down in the
last two weeks before the
earnings announcement
produced more than twice
as many positive as negative
earnings surprises. Matsu-
moto (2002) studied the
different mechanisms used
by firms to meet the
market’s earnings
expectations. Bartov et al.
(2002), also found that firms
have incentives to manage
their earnings forecasts. As
with any form of CEM there
is always the potential for
unfair gain from reversing
the above strategy so as to
sell-short, after creating an
unwarranted positive
expectation.
As mergers and
acquisitions became ever
more common, researchers
have started examining their
effect on CEM. Several
researchers tested
empirically the general
perception of there being
incentives for CEM in the
year proceeding the
announcement and
completion of a deal.
Koumanakos (2005) looked
at data from the Athens
Stock Exchange (from 2001-
03) and found weak
evidence (from a European-
capital-market context, and
consistent with earlier U.S.
studies) that listed acquiring
firms tended to manipulate
earnings upward just prior
to initiation and completion
of the transaction. Ben-
Amar and Missonier Piera
(2008), investigating 50
Swiss firms in an effort to
identify the CEM used in
friendly takeovers during
the period 1990–2002 found
a considerable incentive for
downward-earnings
management, during
theyear proceeding the
transactions.
Erickson and Wang
(1999), examining the
manipulation of accounting
earnings in the period prior
to the announcement and
completion of stock merges,
found that in quarters prior
to the merge, acquiring-
firms manage earnings
upward in an attempt to
increase the share value
preceding the merger. They,
also, found that the
acquiring company’s
accounting manipulations
before the merger were
positively related to the
relative size of the deal.
The effect of government
policies on the incentive of
managers to engage in
earnings management (e.g.,
to encourage government:
price control, pricing, or
other related policies) are
heavily researched (Jones,
1991; Navissi, 1999). Lim
and Matolcsy (1999, p. 131)
found significant “…income
reducing earnings manage-
ment in companies…
subjected to the greatest
scrutiny during a situation
of price controls” in 1970s
in the Australian market.
Navissi (1999) found New
Zealand (NZ) manufacturing
companies, during a period
of general price inflation,
used income decreasing
CEM to show financial
difficulties after a price
freeze by the NZ
government.
Gelinas (2007) noted
that disclosure regulations
can create incentives
forCEM and suggested that
mandatory disclosure is not
an appropriate strategy to
constrain CEM if the
production of information is
costly to firms and if
information asymmetry
exists between managers
and investors. Gelinas
(2007) suggests that the
traditional self-interest
agency model is too narrow
and that a wider and
broader model (with moral
considerations and relaxing
the agency model classical
assumption that individuals
are risk-averse) would
provide a better unders-
tanding on CEM.
Auditor conservatism
plays an important role in
CEM (Nelson et al., 2000).
Specifically, literature on
auditor/client conflicts
appeared around 1980 and
became a popular after
1990. While research in this
area mainly focuses on
factors influencing
managers, it is important to
note that auditors can
greatly influence
management’s choice of
accounting tools. Auditors
appear to be a significant
influence in the choice of
accounting packages during
the earnings management
process (Chen et al., 2001).
The literature also supports
the idea that auditors tend
to engage in a more
conservative choice in
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accounting package,
whereas, managers may be
less conservative. In
examining the literature in
this area, it can be seen that
the research focus has been
two-fold, with: 1) The first
focus on the client’s choice
of auditor, choice of
accounting, and the effect
those choices have on the
auditor; and 2) The second
focus on the effect of the
threat of litigation on
auditors, the specific risk
factors of their clients, and
the accounting choices of
their clients (Stice, 1991).
Bannister and Weist
(2001) suggest that auditors
tend to use conservative
accounting methods and
that this tendency is more
evident if a firm is under the
scrutiny of the regularity
bodies (e.g., SEC, ASX, or
FTSE).5 It is argued that this
conservatism arises out of
two main causal factors: 1)
litigation against auditors
can result from their
negligence; and 2) the SEC
scrutinizes the performance
of auditors and can take
action against any
malfeasance (with the
potential for serious
reprimands, sanctions, or
penalties being imposed on
audit firms and/or
individuals).
Researchers found that
when an audit firm is
employed, both the audit
firm and client have
differing accounting-choice
agendas, with regards to
earnings management. 
Specifically, risk-averse
auditors tend to restrict
their clients on the types
and/or magnitude of
accounting choices they use
in CEM (Lys & Watts, 1994).
Bannister and Weist (2001)
found conclusive evidence in
their study that auditors
were conservative in their
choice of accounting
procedure in earnings
management. Frankel,
Johnson and Nelson (2002)
used U.S. data to examine
the association between the
provision of non-audit fees
and earnings management;
they also considered the
non-audit to total fee ratio
and the stock market
reaction to unexpected
component of that ratio.
Their findings suggest that
business entities that
purchase more non-audit
services from their auditors
are more likely to meet
analysts’ forecast and to
also report larger absolute
discretionary accruals.
Findings suggest there is a
positive association between
small earnings surprises
and the magnitude of
discretionary accruals while
there is a negative
association between non-
audit fees and share values
(Frankel et al. 2002; Magee
& Tseng, 1990).6
Chia, Lapsley and Lee
(2007), in their study of the
effect of firm choice of
auditors in constraining
CEM, during the Asian
financial crisis (in 383
Singapore-listed service 
firms), found that such
firms engaged in income-
decreasing CEM and that
only the Big-6 auditing
firms could significantly
constrain CEM. Craswell et
al. (1995) looking at audit-
quality differentiations,
found significant premiums
earned by Big-6 auditing
firms, over non-auditing
firms. Francis et al., (1999)
and Krishnan (2003), note
that Big-6 audit firms can
improve the quality of
financial statements (via
restrictions on accrual
CEM).7
Job-security and
incumbency rent affect
manager accounting choices
by putting a premium on
current and expected future
performance. Fudenberg
and Torole (1995) set their
assumptions around the
notions that incumbency
rents accrue to managers,
poor performance risks
dismissal and current
reported earnings have more
weight than current reports
of potential future earnings.
Therefore, managers have
significant incentive to make
accounting choices to shift
earnings so as to make the
reports of current financial
outcomes add luster to their
managerial stewardship.
Earnings-increasing
CEM tends to be more
pervasive than income-
decreasing CEM—possibly
because managers are likely
to engage in income
increasing management to
hide poor performance and 
higher performance allows
managers to sell their equity
contingent wealth at higher
prices (Beneish, 2001).
Burgstahler and Dichev
(1997) attributed the
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accruals less obscure; so as
to make specific accruals of
less use, as a means of
CEM. Future research
should, also, follow the gain
from CEM—perhaps, by
carefully considering insider
trading (an observable 
management action, recog-
nized social-wrong and often
unlawful act) as a means for
managers to convert CEM to
personal gain. As the
business characteristics in
different sectors change
with time, it is essential to
examine not only the CEM
behavior but also changes
in CEM behavior and
techniques. Awareness,
through research and
education, of basic business
ethics, corporate
governance, and the socio-
economic conse-quence of
CEM may be a remedial step
in mitigating CEM. Along
those lines, Elias (2004)
found that CPAs in
organizations with strong
ethical standards viewed
CEM as more unethical.
Thus, a corporate culture
with a strong sense of
business ethics and an
awareness of agency pro-
blems and costs is likely to
be a sound means of
combating CEM and its
pernicious effects on
business trust.
Endnotes
1. Such as the Doha
Development Round WTO
discussion—that com-
menced in Nov 2001, but
failed in a related round in
Geneva in July-Aug 2008.
2. For details on early
literature see Jenson and
Meckling, 1976.
3. Business Week 2002.
4. For details on ethical
practices of firms see Batten,
Hettihewa, and Mellor (1997;
1999).
5. Securities Exchange
Commission (SEC), Aus-
tralian Securities Exchange
(ASX), Financial Times (and
London) Stock Exchange
(FTSE).
6. NB: Sarbanes-Oxley
legislation, in 2002, ended
the mixing of non-audit and
audit services for firms listed
on U.S. exchanges.
7. The Big 6 Audit firms of
1995 have shrunk to the Big
4; due to a merger in 1998
and the collapse of Arthur
Andersen in 2002 (due to its
malfeasance with Enron).
8. For more details see
McNichole, 2000, pp. 316-
335.
9. Many studies were
undertaken using the Jones
Model (1991) and ‘Modified
Jones Model’. Dechow et al.,
1995, Guay et al., 1996
state that the modified
Jones model is superior to
other models in isolating the
effect of discretionary
accruals. Improved versions
of this has been used by
researchers (Gul et al.,
2003; Heninger, 2001) using
cross-sectional modified
Jones model in their
studies. The cross-sectional
(e.g., industry specific
parameters) are included in
the modified version to
obtain better information.
Among others, Boonyanet
and Julavittayanukool,
(2008) used a Modified
Jones Model.
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asymmetry favoring reports
of increases in small-
earnings (vs. decreases) to
CEM, rather being a
reflection of the underlying
distribution of earnings
changes. Some studies have
found incentives for
managers to maintain
continuous increases in
earnings (e.g., Berth et al.,
(1995) found that firms with
a consistent pattern of
earnings-increases tended
to command higher price-to-
earnings-multiples).
Income smoothing can
be an important CEM goal.
Specifically, the length of a
string of earnings-rises can
feed into perceptions of
managerial competence. As
a result, a break in a
pattern of consistent
earnings growth tends
impose an average of a 14
percent negative abnormal
stock return on a firm, in
the period the pattern is
broken (DeAngelo, 1996).
Burgstahler and Dichev
(1997) point out that there
is more incentive for
managers to highlight
increases in earnings and,
as a result, tend avoid
reporting decreases. They
also suggest there is
pervasive incentive for
managers to minimize
reporting decreases in
earnings. Two incentives are
suggested for this
phenomenon: 1) transaction
costs are decreased when
managers do not report
decreases and/or losses in
earnings; and 2) per pro-
spect theory, the largest
gains in utility appear when
earnings move from a
relative or absolute loss to a
gain.
Two components of
earnings commonly used by
managers to avoid the
reporting of losses are
operating cash flow and
working-capital changes.
Specifically, increases in
earnings change working
capital. For example,
increased cash sales tend to
increase the cash from
operations. However, that
net effect is uncertain, as
there is also a drop in
inventory (another
component of working
capital); If there is a credit
sale then cash from
operations is not increased,
but there is an increase in
receivables and a reduction
of inventory.
CEM Hypotheses in the
Literature
A wide and varied range
of motivations for CEM are
suggested in the empirical
studies to explain why
managers manipulate
earnings. Three basic
hypotheses tested relevant
to CEM in the literature
(Watts & Zimmerman 1990;
Dechow et al. 1996) are the
1) Bonus-plan (executive
compensation) hypothesis; 2)
Leverage hypothesis; and 3) 
Political cost or “firm size”
hypothesis.
1. The bonus plan hypo-
thesis is  concerned
with whether firms with
accounting-based
bonus plans are more
likely to adopt
accounting methods
that increase reported
earnings (Watts &
Zimmerman, 1978;
Hagerman and
Zmijewski, 1979). Most
of the evidence in the
literature appears to be
consistent with this
hypothesis (Christie,
1990; Healy, 1985).
Later research improved
the power of tests by
using private data on
firm's bonus plans;
including refinements
in methodology (Gaver
et al., 1995; Holthau-
sen, Larcker, & Sloan,
1995).
2. The leverage
hypothesis suggests
managers try to avoid
technical defaults of
loan covenants because
they worry it may reflect
badly on them, if it
increases the firm’s cost
of capital. The empirical
evidence in the litera-
ture, across a broad
range of accounting
policy choices, is
generally consistent
with the leverage
hypothesis with few
exceptions (Christie,
1990; Press &
Weintrop, 1990; Duke 
& Hunt, 1990). DeFond,
Jiambalvo (1994), and
Sweeney (1994) found
that managers manipu-
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stock return on a firm, in
the period the pattern is
broken (DeAngelo, 1996).
Burgstahler and Dichev
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also suggest there is
pervasive incentive for
managers to minimize
reporting decreases in
earnings. Two incentives are
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phenomenon: 1) transaction
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managers do not report
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earnings; and 2) per pro-
spect theory, the largest
gains in utility appear when
earnings move from a
relative or absolute loss to a
gain.
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earnings commonly used by
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working-capital changes.
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capital. For example,
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there is also a drop in
inventory (another
component of working
capital); If there is a credit
sale then cash from
operations is not increased,
but there is an increase in
receivables and a reduction
of inventory.
CEM Hypotheses in the
Literature
A wide and varied range
of motivations for CEM are
suggested in the empirical
studies to explain why
managers manipulate
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hypotheses tested relevant
to CEM in the literature
(Watts & Zimmerman 1990;
Dechow et al. 1996) are the
1) Bonus-plan (executive
compensation) hypothesis; 2)
Leverage hypothesis; and 3) 
Political cost or “firm size”
hypothesis.
1. The bonus plan hypo-
thesis is  concerned
with whether firms with
accounting-based
bonus plans are more
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earnings (Watts &
Zimmerman, 1978;
Hagerman and
Zmijewski, 1979). Most
of the evidence in the
literature appears to be
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hypothesis (Christie,
1990; Healy, 1985).
Later research improved
the power of tests by
using private data on
firm's bonus plans;
including refinements
in methodology (Gaver
et al., 1995; Holthau-
sen, Larcker, & Sloan,
1995).
2. The leverage
hypothesis suggests
managers try to avoid
technical defaults of
loan covenants because
they worry it may reflect
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increases the firm’s cost
of capital. The empirical
evidence in the litera-
ture, across a broad
range of accounting
policy choices, is
generally consistent
with the leverage
hypothesis with few
exceptions (Christie,
1990; Press &
Weintrop, 1990; Duke 
& Hunt, 1990). DeFond,
Jiambalvo (1994), and
Sweeney (1994) found
that managers manipu-
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late earnings to or
above what was
reported in the year
before.
3. The political cost
hypothesis suggests
that the decision to use
income-decreasing
accounting changes is a
function of firm size
and influence (Watts &
Zimmerman, 1978);
e.g., Wong (1988)
looked at large export
firms in NZ and found
that, if they wanted to
reduce the chances of
income-tax reform, they
tended to use
accounting methods
that increased their
apparent tax rates; and
Jones (1991) found that
firms, seeking
government relief, often
manipulated accruals to
reduce reported
earnings.
Assumptions on type
of choice. Models of
managers’ decision to use
accounting choices to
facilitate CEM are based on
an assumption that
managers, expecting poor
performance in the next
earning period (e.g., it will
be less than the stakeholder
median expectations) are
worried that the poor
performance will cause them
grief (termination, reduced
bonuses, delayed promo-
tion, etc.). Morck et al.,
(1989) and Blackwell et al., 
(1994) show that such an
assumption is reasonable;
that the likelihood of
management dismissal
varies inversely with the
stakeholder perceptions of
the quality of managerial
stewardship. As a result of
these fears, it is argued that
when firms have good
current performance and
expect poor future
performance, their
managers will engage in
income-decreasing accruals.
Conversely, if the current
performance is poor and
expected future performance
is good, the firm’s managers
are likely to engage in
income-increasing accruals.
In further support of these
assumptions, it was found
that predictions with regard
to discretionary accruals are
more accurate if they are
based on both current and
future performance than if
they are based on current
performance, alone. These
findings support the
premise that the income
smoothing motive arises, at
least in part, from concerns
about job security (Defond &
Park, 1997).
Privately vs. publicly
held banking organiza-
tions. After the late 1990s,
there is an increasing
emphasis on CEM in the
banking industry. The belief
that stakeholder perceptions
of public bank performance
tended to rely more on
earnings-based benchmarks
than their perception of the
performance of privately 
held banks, caused
researchers to empirically
test if publicly held banks
have a greater incentive to
report steadily increasing
earnings. Beatty et al.
(2002), examining 1987-
1998 data for differences in
earnings management
incentives between publicly
held and privately held
banks, found (even after
controlling for bank size,
cash flows and differences
in the types of loans written)
that private banks with
earnings near zero are
significantly more likely to
report losses than public
banks with earnings near
zero; they also found that
public banks reported
relatively fewer small
earnings declines, were
more favorable to using loan
provisions and security
gains to abolish small
earnings decreases, and
reported longer strings of
consecutive earnings
increases.
 Perception of ethics
and CEM. Elias (2004) used
a survey of 583 Certified
Public Accountants (CPAs)
in public accounting,
academia and industry to
examine the relationship
between perceptions of CEM
and corporate ethical
values, and found that CPAs
employed in organizations
with strong ethical
standards considered CEM
as more unethical. They,
also, found that perceptions
of corporate values were
affected by gender, age, job 
title and demographic
factors.
Boards of directors and
corporate governance have
an important influence on
how CEM is perceived.
Chtourou and Bedard
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examining the extant
accruals model, it can be
seen that the model fails to
distinguish between
accruals that result from
managerial discretion and
those that result from
changes in the firm’s
economic performance. This
failure is problematic, as it
is not possible to definitively
link changes in accruals to
efficient operating decisions
or (CEM) reporting con-
siderations (Beneish, 2001).
Dechow et al. (1995) use
a modified Jones model to
track residuals from a
regression of total accruals
on change in sales and
property, plant and
equipment, where revenue is
adjusted for change in
receivables in the period.
Kang and Sivaramakish-
anan (1995) use residuals
from regression of non-cash
current assets less current
liabilities on lagged levels
adjusted for increases in
revenue expenses and plant
and equipment. MacNichols
and Wilson (1988) use the
residual provision-for-bad-
debts as the proxy for
discretionary accruals. This
component of bad debt was
estimated as the residual
from a regression of the
provision for bad debts on
the allowance beginning
balance and current and
future write off. Petroni
(1992) found that a claim-
loss reserve estimation error
measured at a five-year 
development of loss reserves
of property casualty
insurers in using
discretionary accrual proxy.
When measuring residual
allowance for loan losses,
Beaver and Engel (1996) use
the residuals, from a
regression of allowance for
loan losses on loan net
charge-offs. Unlike other
studies Beneish (1997)
focuses on indices, using
days in receivables index,
gross merging index, asset
quality index, depreciation
index, selling general and
administrative expense
index and total accrual to
total assets index as the
proxies in the specific
accrual model. Beaver and
McNichols (1998) use serial
correlation of one-year
development of loss reserves
of property casualty
insurers. In the recent
literature, the issue of how 
accruals behave in the
absence of earnings
management is considered
an important issue as many
studies were carried out by
modeling non-discretionary
accruals and inferring
discretionary accruals.
Researchers find that if
management manipulates
accruals, there is a negative
correlation between non-
discretionary and
discretionary accruals as a
result of an attempt to
smooth out the income
series. The Petroni et al.
(2000) approach is to model
the discretionary component
of accruals based on
management’s incentives to
exercise discretion. By doing
that the study allows for
separation of the estimation
error in the discretionary
accrual part from that in the
estimate of non-
discretionary accrual
component.
 Dechow et al. (1995),
Kasznik (1999), and Thomas
and Zhang (2000) found
that discretionary accrual
estimates correlate with
earnings performance,
showing a clear relationship
with higher (lower) earnings
and positive (negative)
discretionary accruals.
Specifically, CEM was
evidenced by increasing
earnings for the most
profitable firms and by
decreasing earnings for the
least profitable firms.
 It is argued that
managers in financial
institutions and insurance
companies in sectors that
require them to balance 
financial reporting
incentives with regulatory
constraints, have significant
incentives to manage
earnings. Further studies in
these areas have concluded
that regulatory capital and
decreasing taxes balance
those associated with
increasing taxes (i.e.,
income smoothing;
McNichols, 2000). As these
studies focus on the
discretion associated with
particular accruals (e.g.,
loan loss provisions in the
banking industry and claim
loss provisions in the
insurance industry, bad
debt provisions; MicNicols
and Wilson, 1988) problems
associated with using a
model of expectation for
aggregate accruals are
avoided. According to
Petroni (1992), loss reserves
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(2001), investigated whether
an organization’s corporate
governance practices have
an effect on the quality of its
publicly announced
financial information. They
examined the relationship
between audit committee
and director boards
characteristics and the
extent of CEM in the U.S.
market in 1996. After
grouping their study
subjects into relatively high
and relatively low levels of
discretionary accruals, they
found that CEM is related to
some of the governance
practices by the audit
committee and board of
directors and that income-
decreasing CEM is greatly
reduced by one or more
members having financial
expertise. Kanagaretnam,
Lobo, and Whalen (2007),
sought to determine if firms
with high corporate
governance have lower
information asymmetry
around quarterly-earnings
announcements in the
equity market, by using bid-
ask spread and depth to
find the relationship to
board independence, board
structure, and board
activity. They found that the
changes in the bid-ask
spread, at the time of
earnings announcements,
are negatively related to
factors such as: board
independence, board
activity, and the percentage
stock holdings of directors
and officers.
Model Specifications
and Weaknesses
A Variety of Methodologies
Although the aggregate
accruals approach has been
the most commonly used
method for more than a
decade, there are
alternatives. Recent CEM
studies have looked at
specific accruals (e.g.,
provision for bad debt) or
focused on specific sectors
(e.g., the claim loss reserve 
in the insurance industry).
McNichole (2000) asserts
that among other methods,
the most popular and widely
used alternatives to identify
and evaluate the presence
CEM involve the use of
 
• Aggregate accruals, with
regression to calculate
expected and unexpected
accruals,
• Specific accruals such as
the provision for bad debt,
or accruals in specific
sectors such as the
insurance industry and
the claim loss reserve,
and
• Discontinuities in the
earnings flow and/or the
distribution of earnings.
Reported earnings can
be accrual based or cash-
flow based. The main
challenge faced by CEM
researchers is their inability
to clearly identify and 
measure the fraction of
accruals arising from CEM.
This is because such
accounting actions are, by
their nature, less than
transparent. Therefore,
previous research is largely
subjective, with models
being based on judgment of
the intent behind accruals
and other discretionary
estimates in reporting
earnings. In other words,
assumptions and judgment
are used in testing both
incentives to manage
earnings and in the validity
of accrual models. The
explosive growth of research
in accrual-based CEM has
two main causes.
1. The principal product of
Generally Accepted
Accounting Principles
(GAAP) is accruals and
if earnings are managed
it is more likely that the
CEM occurs on accrual
rather than on the cash
flow part of earnings,
and
2. Difficulties in
measuring the effect of
various accounting
choices; thus, if CEM is
considered to be an
unobservable
component of accruals,
it is possible that
investors will be unable
to determine the effect
of CEM on reported
earnings.
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There are two main
perspectives on CEM:
Opportunistic perspective
and information perspective.
The opportunistic perspec-
tive suggests that managers
seek to mislead investors;
whereas, the information
perspective argues that
managers use their discre-
tion when providing
information to investors on
their personal view as to a
firm’s future cash flow.
There has been much
research on the opportu--
nistic perspective but
limited for the information
perspective with regards to
CEM (Beneish, 2001).
Starting with Healy
(1985) and DeAngelo (1988),
there were many attempts to
measure and analyze total
accruals and changes in
accruals. Jones (1991)
introduced a regression
approach to control for
nondiscretionary variables
(e.g., changes in sales,
property, plant, and
equipment, which influence
accruals). Many researchers
contributed to this
aggregate accrual approach,
by adding a variety of non-
discretionary variables into
the regression analysis.
Disagreements as to how
aggregate accruals in CEM
models has led to
alternatives (e.g., the
specific accrual model where
researchers focus on a
particular area such as the
provision for bad debt or
focus on a specific sector
such as the insurance
industry). McNichols (2000,
p. 333) suggest that
specific- accrual models
have three advantages: 1)
Researchers “…can develop
intuition for the key factors
that influence the behavior
of the accrual, exploiting his
or her knowledge of
generally accepted
accounting principles…”; 2)
They “…can be applied in
industries whose business
practices cause the accrual
in question to be a material
and a likely object of
judgment and discretion...”;
and 3) “…the relationship
between the single accrual
and explanatory factors [can
be estimated] directly.”
However, this approach
(because of its focus on a
particular industry) requires
a large investment of time
and effort to gain knowledge
that is specific to a given
industry rather than being
generalizable across many
industries. A related issue is
the high costs arising from
the approaches need for
more knowledge and often
specific knowledge on the
entity, its industry, and
business environment.8
Weaknesses in the
Research Designs Based
on Aggregate Accruals
In using the accrual
models it can be seen that
there is a considerable
amount of imprecision in
the estimating discretionary
accruals, especially if they
are aggregated. As a result,
some accrual models cause
earnings to be randomly
decomposed into 
discretionary and non-
discretionary components.
Bernard and Skinner
(1996) use discretionary
accruals as a proxy and that
the accruals-based tests can
provide evidence that CEM
exists. However, this
approach requires that the
measured error in the
discretionary accrual proxy
not be correlated with the
partitioning factors in the
research design.
Other researchers have
used alternative methodo-
logy in the study of CEM.
One such group examined
the discontinuities in the
distribution of reported
earnings around three
thresholds. The thresholds
used are zero earnings, last
year’s earnings and this
year’s analysts’ expecta-
tions. It is suggested that,
looking at determinants of
earnings behavior through
this view is useful to
determine which firms are
likely practicing CEM.
However, this approach does
little to portray the form and
extent of CEM (Beneish,
2001).
Since the introduction of
aggregate accruals models,
a large number of studies
have been undertaken,
using a variety of related
methodologies (Jones,
1991). McNichole (2000)
noted that, during the
period 1993-99, many
studies (45.5%) used
residuals from aggregate
accrual models, nearly 20
percent of the studies used
specific accruals, 7.3 
percent of researchers used
total accruals and a similar
fraction engaged in asset
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sales and asset write-offs,
9.1 percent used accounting
changes, 3.6 percent used
unusual gains/(losses), and
another 3.6 percent focused
on incidents of accounting
enforcement by SEC (the
rest used distribution of
earnings change in research
and development
expenditure from prior year
and other methodologies).
Variable- and Model-
Specification Issues
Collins and Hribar
(2002) examined the gap
between Empirical
Procedures and Institutional
Knowledge of the Behavior of
Accounting Accruals. In the
absence of earnings
manipulations, if receivables
are a firm’s only accrual, it
is important to identify the
relationship between
receivables and the change
in its sales. Receivables can
also be affected by credit
policy changes. It is
important to note that
changes in receivables arise
from both real and
discretionary effects. In the
absence of CEM there are
number of other factors that
contribute to relationship
between firm’s sales and
receivables (e.g., revenue
recognition policy and
working capital manage-
ment). Lower receivables
and discretionary-accruals
levels can result from selling
receivables through
factoring or securitization.
Channel stuffing is a
form of CEM where down-
stream distributors are
pressured to make early
purchases. However, the
impact of this discretionary
accrual depends on how the
customer behaves in paying
for the products. Estimated
discretionary accruals can
be influenced by customers
when they accelerate
purchasing behaviour due
to anticipated price
increases. However, this
cannot be considered as
CEM, unless management
creates or influence the
anticipation. Researchers
found that using firm size as
an independent variable
creates numerous
methodological problems, in
CEM models (Christie et al.,
1993).
Throughout the 1990s
and 2000s, Burgstahler and
Dichev (1997) and other
researchers examined the
frequency of annual
earnings realization was
examined by using the
region-above-zero earnings
and last-year’s earnings to
determine which was
greater. DeGeorge et al.
(1999) examined the
frequency of quarterly-
earnings realizations
above/(below) zero earnings
and last quarter’s earnings
and found that it was
possible to make strong
predictions about the
behavior of earnings in
narrow intervals. The idea
was to test for discontin-
uities due to the exercise of
discretion. Their findings 
suggest that earnings are
often managed to obtain
earnings targets, especially
positive ones. Myers and
Skinner (2000) consider the
number of consecutive
earnings increases, to see
whether it is greater than
expected in the absence of
CEM. Different studies use
different proxies for
discretionary accruals, for
example: Healy (1985) uses
total accruals, DeAngelo
(1988) uses changes in total
accruals, and Collins and
Hribar (2002) use current
asset and liability accounts
less depreciation to proxy
accruals (giving them larger
sample sizes, over a longer
period of time). Non-current
accruals do not reflect year-
specific discretion; therefore
current accruals are a more
accurate measure of year-
by-year discretionary
behavior, than what is
provided by aggregate
accruals (Jones, 1991).
The most widely used
model in studies of
aggregate accruals is the
Jones (1991) model (based
on the suggestion made by
Kaplan, 1985) that changes
in a firm’s economic
condition and manager
discretion results in
accruals. The model relates
total accruals to the change
in sales and the level of
gross property, plant and
equipment. Two
assumptions are made with
the use of this model: 1) a
firm’s economic
environment is linked to
changes in its sales or sales 
growth; which 2) results in
changes in working capital
or current accruals. In
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Kaplan, 1985) that changes
in a firm’s economic
condition and manager
discretion results in
accruals. The model relates
total accruals to the change
in sales and the level of
gross property, plant and
equipment. Two
assumptions are made with
the use of this model: 1) a
firm’s economic
environment is linked to
changes in its sales or sales 
growth; which 2) results in
changes in working capital
or current accruals. In
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examining the extant
accruals model, it can be
seen that the model fails to
distinguish between
accruals that result from
managerial discretion and
those that result from
changes in the firm’s
economic performance. This
failure is problematic, as it
is not possible to definitively
link changes in accruals to
efficient operating decisions
or (CEM) reporting con-
siderations (Beneish, 2001).
Dechow et al. (1995) use
a modified Jones model to
track residuals from a
regression of total accruals
on change in sales and
property, plant and
equipment, where revenue is
adjusted for change in
receivables in the period.
Kang and Sivaramakish-
anan (1995) use residuals
from regression of non-cash
current assets less current
liabilities on lagged levels
adjusted for increases in
revenue expenses and plant
and equipment. MacNichols
and Wilson (1988) use the
residual provision-for-bad-
debts as the proxy for
discretionary accruals. This
component of bad debt was
estimated as the residual
from a regression of the
provision for bad debts on
the allowance beginning
balance and current and
future write off. Petroni
(1992) found that a claim-
loss reserve estimation error
measured at a five-year 
development of loss reserves
of property casualty
insurers in using
discretionary accrual proxy.
When measuring residual
allowance for loan losses,
Beaver and Engel (1996) use
the residuals, from a
regression of allowance for
loan losses on loan net
charge-offs. Unlike other
studies Beneish (1997)
focuses on indices, using
days in receivables index,
gross merging index, asset
quality index, depreciation
index, selling general and
administrative expense
index and total accrual to
total assets index as the
proxies in the specific
accrual model. Beaver and
McNichols (1998) use serial
correlation of one-year
development of loss reserves
of property casualty
insurers. In the recent
literature, the issue of how 
accruals behave in the
absence of earnings
management is considered
an important issue as many
studies were carried out by
modeling non-discretionary
accruals and inferring
discretionary accruals.
Researchers find that if
management manipulates
accruals, there is a negative
correlation between non-
discretionary and
discretionary accruals as a
result of an attempt to
smooth out the income
series. The Petroni et al.
(2000) approach is to model
the discretionary component
of accruals based on
management’s incentives to
exercise discretion. By doing
that the study allows for
separation of the estimation
error in the discretionary
accrual part from that in the
estimate of non-
discretionary accrual
component.
 Dechow et al. (1995),
Kasznik (1999), and Thomas
and Zhang (2000) found
that discretionary accrual
estimates correlate with
earnings performance,
showing a clear relationship
with higher (lower) earnings
and positive (negative)
discretionary accruals.
Specifically, CEM was
evidenced by increasing
earnings for the most
profitable firms and by
decreasing earnings for the
least profitable firms.
 It is argued that
managers in financial
institutions and insurance
companies in sectors that
require them to balance 
financial reporting
incentives with regulatory
constraints, have significant
incentives to manage
earnings. Further studies in
these areas have concluded
that regulatory capital and
decreasing taxes balance
those associated with
increasing taxes (i.e.,
income smoothing;
McNichols, 2000). As these
studies focus on the
discretion associated with
particular accruals (e.g.,
loan loss provisions in the
banking industry and claim
loss provisions in the
insurance industry, bad
debt provisions; MicNicols
and Wilson, 1988) problems
associated with using a
model of expectation for
aggregate accruals are
avoided. According to
Petroni (1992), loss reserves
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late earnings to or
above what was
reported in the year
before.
3. The political cost
hypothesis suggests
that the decision to use
income-decreasing
accounting changes is a
function of firm size
and influence (Watts &
Zimmerman, 1978);
e.g., Wong (1988)
looked at large export
firms in NZ and found
that, if they wanted to
reduce the chances of
income-tax reform, they
tended to use
accounting methods
that increased their
apparent tax rates; and
Jones (1991) found that
firms, seeking
government relief, often
manipulated accruals to
reduce reported
earnings.
Assumptions on type
of choice. Models of
managers’ decision to use
accounting choices to
facilitate CEM are based on
an assumption that
managers, expecting poor
performance in the next
earning period (e.g., it will
be less than the stakeholder
median expectations) are
worried that the poor
performance will cause them
grief (termination, reduced
bonuses, delayed promo-
tion, etc.). Morck et al.,
(1989) and Blackwell et al., 
(1994) show that such an
assumption is reasonable;
that the likelihood of
management dismissal
varies inversely with the
stakeholder perceptions of
the quality of managerial
stewardship. As a result of
these fears, it is argued that
when firms have good
current performance and
expect poor future
performance, their
managers will engage in
income-decreasing accruals.
Conversely, if the current
performance is poor and
expected future performance
is good, the firm’s managers
are likely to engage in
income-increasing accruals.
In further support of these
assumptions, it was found
that predictions with regard
to discretionary accruals are
more accurate if they are
based on both current and
future performance than if
they are based on current
performance, alone. These
findings support the
premise that the income
smoothing motive arises, at
least in part, from concerns
about job security (Defond &
Park, 1997).
Privately vs. publicly
held banking organiza-
tions. After the late 1990s,
there is an increasing
emphasis on CEM in the
banking industry. The belief
that stakeholder perceptions
of public bank performance
tended to rely more on
earnings-based benchmarks
than their perception of the
performance of privately 
held banks, caused
researchers to empirically
test if publicly held banks
have a greater incentive to
report steadily increasing
earnings. Beatty et al.
(2002), examining 1987-
1998 data for differences in
earnings management
incentives between publicly
held and privately held
banks, found (even after
controlling for bank size,
cash flows and differences
in the types of loans written)
that private banks with
earnings near zero are
significantly more likely to
report losses than public
banks with earnings near
zero; they also found that
public banks reported
relatively fewer small
earnings declines, were
more favorable to using loan
provisions and security
gains to abolish small
earnings decreases, and
reported longer strings of
consecutive earnings
increases.
 Perception of ethics
and CEM. Elias (2004) used
a survey of 583 Certified
Public Accountants (CPAs)
in public accounting,
academia and industry to
examine the relationship
between perceptions of CEM
and corporate ethical
values, and found that CPAs
employed in organizations
with strong ethical
standards considered CEM
as more unethical. They,
also, found that perceptions
of corporate values were
affected by gender, age, job 
title and demographic
factors.
Boards of directors and
corporate governance have
an important influence on
how CEM is perceived.
Chtourou and Bedard
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are underestimated by
financially weak insurers,
relative to companies who
have greater financial
strength.
Different Views on a Range
of CEM Models
• The DeAngelo Model
(1986) tested for CEM by
calculating first
differences in total
accruals, and by
assuming that the first
differences have an
expected value of zero
under the null hypothesis
of no CEM. In that the
last period's total
accruals, scaled by lagged
total assets are used, as
the measure of nondiscre-
tionary accruals.
• The Jones Model is made
more descriptive of actual
events by relaxing the
assumption that
nondiscretionary accruals
are constant. Jones
(1991) recognises this
limitation of the model.9
• A modification of the
Jones model (see Dechow
et al., 1995) was designed
to measure discretionary
accruals with error when
managerial discretion is
exercised over revenues to
eliminate this bias of the
Jones Model (1991).
• The Industry Model. The
Industry Model relaxes
the assumption that NDA
is constant over time.
However, rather than
directly modelling
measures of non-
discretionary accruals,
the Industry Model
assumes that the
variation in measures of
NDA are common across
firms in the same
industry group (for
details, see Dechow and
Sloan, 1991).
• Collins and Hribar (2002)
depicts that total accruals
are the difference between
reported net income and
operating cash flow where
net income is earnings
before extraordinary items
and discontinued opera-
tions. 
Conclusion and
Suggestions for
Future Research
Flowing through the
plethora of methods and
approaches used by CEM
researchers and their all too
often conflicting findings,
this study found (as a
common theme in CEM
literature) an ongoing effort
to understand
• Why corporate managers
manipulate earnings, 
• How earnings are
manipulated, and CEM
effects on stakeholders (in
particular), practitioners,
and society (in general).
While managers often
emphasize the importance of
improved earnings in
annual reports and in press
coverage and CEOs
comment on increased
earnings per share as the
key objective in their
corporate mandate, research
findings suggest a diversity
of incentives for CEM and
researchers and have
empirically tested for such
incentives, via a variety of 
statistical techniques,
models, and proxies. The
research often generates
strong evidence for CEM,
but has failed to achieve the
consensus needed to
support a single 
model and/or to provide
practitioners with a solid
insight into resolving this 
issue. Thus, the search for
new CEM models continues.
This study found that
while the basic purpose of
CEM (to gain advantage by
misinformation) has
remained constant, the
methods of CEM have
become more sophisticated
over the decades. Thus, a
simple unified theory of
CEM is unlikely to ever
become viable as a means of
understanding and
controlling CEM.
In examining income
manipulation, future 
research needs to focus on
resolving the general
absence of transparency in
the decision-making process
of managers engaged in
CEM. While specific
accruals need further
examination to offset
problems associated with
aggregate accrual models,
future research needs to
make the intent behind
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accruals less obscure; so as
to make specific accruals of
less use, as a means of
CEM. Future research
should, also, follow the gain
from CEM—perhaps, by
carefully considering insider
trading (an observable 
management action, recog-
nized social-wrong and often
unlawful act) as a means for
managers to convert CEM to
personal gain. As the
business characteristics in
different sectors change
with time, it is essential to
examine not only the CEM
behavior but also changes
in CEM behavior and
techniques. Awareness,
through research and
education, of basic business
ethics, corporate
governance, and the socio-
economic conse-quence of
CEM may be a remedial step
in mitigating CEM. Along
those lines, Elias (2004)
found that CPAs in
organizations with strong
ethical standards viewed
CEM as more unethical.
Thus, a corporate culture
with a strong sense of
business ethics and an
awareness of agency pro-
blems and costs is likely to
be a sound means of
combating CEM and its
pernicious effects on
business trust.
Endnotes
1. Such as the Doha
Development Round WTO
discussion—that com-
menced in Nov 2001, but
failed in a related round in
Geneva in July-Aug 2008.
2. For details on early
literature see Jenson and
Meckling, 1976.
3. Business Week 2002.
4. For details on ethical
practices of firms see Batten,
Hettihewa, and Mellor (1997;
1999).
5. Securities Exchange
Commission (SEC), Aus-
tralian Securities Exchange
(ASX), Financial Times (and
London) Stock Exchange
(FTSE).
6. NB: Sarbanes-Oxley
legislation, in 2002, ended
the mixing of non-audit and
audit services for firms listed
on U.S. exchanges.
7. The Big 6 Audit firms of
1995 have shrunk to the Big
4; due to a merger in 1998
and the collapse of Arthur
Andersen in 2002 (due to its
malfeasance with Enron).
8. For more details see
McNichole, 2000, pp. 316-
335.
9. Many studies were
undertaken using the Jones
Model (1991) and ‘Modified
Jones Model’. Dechow et al.,
1995, Guay et al., 1996
state that the modified
Jones model is superior to
other models in isolating the
effect of discretionary
accruals. Improved versions
of this has been used by
researchers (Gul et al.,
2003; Heninger, 2001) using
cross-sectional modified
Jones model in their
studies. The cross-sectional
(e.g., industry specific
parameters) are included in
the modified version to
obtain better information.
Among others, Boonyanet
and Julavittayanukool,
(2008) used a Modified
Jones Model.
References
Bagnoli, M., & Watts, S. G.
(2000). The effect of
relative performance
evaluation on earnings
management: A game-
theoretic approach.
Journal of Accounting
and Public Policy,
19(4/5), 377-397.
Bannister, J. W., & Weist,
D. N. (2001). Earnings
management and
auditor conservatism:
Effects of SEC
enforcement actions.
Managerial Finance, 27,
57–71.
Bartov, E., Givoly, D., &
Hayn, C. (2002). The
rewards to meeting or
beating earnings
expectations. Journal of
Accounting & Economics,
33, 173-204.
Batten, J. B., Hettihewa, S.,
& Mellor, R. (1997). The
ethical management
practices of Australian
firms. Journal of
22 Winter 2010 Southern Business Review
accounting package,
whereas, managers may be
less conservative. In
examining the literature in
this area, it can be seen that
the research focus has been
two-fold, with: 1) The first
focus on the client’s choice
of auditor, choice of
accounting, and the effect
those choices have on the
auditor; and 2) The second
focus on the effect of the
threat of litigation on
auditors, the specific risk
factors of their clients, and
the accounting choices of
their clients (Stice, 1991).
Bannister and Weist
(2001) suggest that auditors
tend to use conservative
accounting methods and
that this tendency is more
evident if a firm is under the
scrutiny of the regularity
bodies (e.g., SEC, ASX, or
FTSE).5 It is argued that this
conservatism arises out of
two main causal factors: 1)
litigation against auditors
can result from their
negligence; and 2) the SEC
scrutinizes the performance
of auditors and can take
action against any
malfeasance (with the
potential for serious
reprimands, sanctions, or
penalties being imposed on
audit firms and/or
individuals).
Researchers found that
when an audit firm is
employed, both the audit
firm and client have
differing accounting-choice
agendas, with regards to
earnings management. 
Specifically, risk-averse
auditors tend to restrict
their clients on the types
and/or magnitude of
accounting choices they use
in CEM (Lys & Watts, 1994).
Bannister and Weist (2001)
found conclusive evidence in
their study that auditors
were conservative in their
choice of accounting
procedure in earnings
management. Frankel,
Johnson and Nelson (2002)
used U.S. data to examine
the association between the
provision of non-audit fees
and earnings management;
they also considered the
non-audit to total fee ratio
and the stock market
reaction to unexpected
component of that ratio.
Their findings suggest that
business entities that
purchase more non-audit
services from their auditors
are more likely to meet
analysts’ forecast and to
also report larger absolute
discretionary accruals.
Findings suggest there is a
positive association between
small earnings surprises
and the magnitude of
discretionary accruals while
there is a negative
association between non-
audit fees and share values
(Frankel et al. 2002; Magee
& Tseng, 1990).6
Chia, Lapsley and Lee
(2007), in their study of the
effect of firm choice of
auditors in constraining
CEM, during the Asian
financial crisis (in 383
Singapore-listed service 
firms), found that such
firms engaged in income-
decreasing CEM and that
only the Big-6 auditing
firms could significantly
constrain CEM. Craswell et
al. (1995) looking at audit-
quality differentiations,
found significant premiums
earned by Big-6 auditing
firms, over non-auditing
firms. Francis et al., (1999)
and Krishnan (2003), note
that Big-6 audit firms can
improve the quality of
financial statements (via
restrictions on accrual
CEM).7
Job-security and
incumbency rent affect
manager accounting choices
by putting a premium on
current and expected future
performance. Fudenberg
and Torole (1995) set their
assumptions around the
notions that incumbency
rents accrue to managers,
poor performance risks
dismissal and current
reported earnings have more
weight than current reports
of potential future earnings.
Therefore, managers have
significant incentive to make
accounting choices to shift
earnings so as to make the
reports of current financial
outcomes add luster to their
managerial stewardship.
Earnings-increasing
CEM tends to be more
pervasive than income-
decreasing CEM—possibly
because managers are likely
to engage in income
increasing management to
hide poor performance and 
higher performance allows
managers to sell their equity
contingent wealth at higher
prices (Beneish, 2001).
Burgstahler and Dichev
(1997) attributed the
Southern Business Review Winter 2010 31
Business Ethics, 16,
1261-1271.
Batten, J. B., Hettihewa, S.,
& Mellor, R. (1999).
Factors affecting ethical
management:
Comparing a developed
and developing
economy.  Journal of
Business Ethics, 19, 51-
59.
Beatty, A. L., Ke, B., &
Petroni, K. R. (2002).
Earnings management 
to avoid earnings
declines across publicly
and privately held
banks. Accounting
Review, 77(3), 547-570. 
Beaver, W., & McNichols, M.
(1998). The
characteristics and
valuation of loss
reserves of property
casualty insurers.
Review of Accounting
Studies, 3(1-2), 73-95.
Ben-Amar, W., & Missonier-
Piera, F. (2008).
Earnings management
by friendly take-over
targets. International
Journal of Managerial
Finance, 4 (3), 232-243.
Beneish, M. D. (1997).
Detecting GAAP
violation: Implications
for assessing earnings
management among
firms with extreme
financial performance.
Journal of Accounting
and Public PolicyI, 16 (3),
271-309.
Beneish, M. D. (1998). A call
for papers: Earnings
management. Journal of
Accounting and Public
Policy, 17, 85-88.
Beneish, M. D. (2001).
Earnings management:
A perspective.
Managerial Finance, 27,
3-17.
Bernhardt, D., & Campello,
M. (2007). The dynamics
of earnings forecast
management. Review of
Finance, 11(2), 287-324.
Bernard, V., & Skinner, D.
(1996). What motivates
managers’ choice of
discretionary accruals?
Journal of Accounting &
Economics, 22, 313-325.
Blackwell, D., Brickley, J., &
Weisbach, M. (1994).
Accounting information
and internal control
evaluation performance.
Journal of Accounting &
Economics, 17, 331-358.
Boonyanet, W., &
Julavittayanukool, J.
(2008). The association
between earnings
management and audit
fees of listed companies
in the stock exchange of
Thailand. The 20th Asia-
Pacific Conference on
Iinternational Accounting
Issues, Paris. 
Bourgeois, L .J. (1985).
Strategic goals,
perceived uncertainty
and economic
performance in volatile
environments. Academy
of Management Journal,
28, 548-573.
Bowen, R., DuCharme, L., &
Shores, D. (1995).
Stakeholders’ implicit
claims and accounting
method choice. Journal 
of Accounting and
Economics, 20(3), 255-
296.
Burgstahler, D., & Dichev, I.
(1997). Earnings
management to avoid
earnings decreases and
losses. Journal of
Accounting and
Economics, 24(1), 99-
126.
Business Week. (2002,
January 28). Accounting
in crisis: What needs to
be done. Business Week.
Chan, K., Chann, L.,
Jegadeesh, N., &
Lakonishok, L. (2006).
Earnings quality and
stock returns. Journal of
Business, 79, 1041-
1082.
Chen, C. J. P., Chen, S., &
Su, X. (2001).
Profitability regulation,
earnings management
and modified audit
opinions. Auditing, 9, 9-
30.
Chia, M. Y., Lapsley, L., &
Lee, H. (2007). Choice of
auditors and earnings
management during the
Asian financial crisis. 
Southern Business Review Winter 2010 31
Business Ethics, 16,
1261-1271.
Batten, J. B., Hettihewa, S.,
& Mellor, R. (1999).
Factors affecting ethical
management:
Comparing a developed
and developing
economy.  Journal of
Business Ethics, 19, 51-
59.
Beatty, A. L., Ke, B., &
Petroni, K. R. (2002).
Earnings management 
to avoid earnings
declines across publicly
and privately held
banks. Accounting
Review, 77(3), 547-570. 
Beaver, W., & McNichols, M.
(1998). The
characteristics and
valuation of loss
reserves of property
casualty insurers.
Review of Accounting
Studies, 3(1-2), 73-95.
Ben-Amar, W., & Missonier-
Piera, F. (2008).
Earnings management
by friendly take-over
targets. International
Journal of Managerial
Finance, 4 (3), 232-243.
Beneish, M. D. (1997).
Detecting GAAP
violation: Implications
for assessing earnings
management among
firms with extreme
financial performance.
Journal of Accounting
and Public PolicyI, 16 (3),
271-309.
Beneish, M. D. (1998). A call
for papers: Earnings
management. Journal of
Accounting and Public
Policy, 17, 85-88.
Beneish, M. D. (2001).
Earnings management:
A perspective.
Managerial Finance, 27,
3-17.
Bernhardt, D., & Campello,
M. (2007). The dynamics
of earnings forecast
management. Review of
Finance, 11(2), 287-324.
Bernard, V., & Skinner, D.
(1996). What motivates
managers’ choice of
discretionary accruals?
Journal of Accounting &
Economics, 22, 313-325.
Blackwell, D., Brickley, J., &
Weisbach, M. (1994).
Accounting information
and internal control
evaluation performance.
Journal of Accounting &
Economics, 17, 331-358.
Boonyanet, W., &
Julavittayanukool, J.
(2008). The association
between earnings
management and audit
fees of listed companies
in the stock exchange of
Thailand. The 20th Asia-
Pacific Conference on
Iinternational Accounting
Issues, Paris. 
Bourgeois, L .J. (1985).
Strategic goals,
perceived uncertainty
and economic
performance in volatile
environments. Academy
of Management Journal,
28, 548-573.
Bowen, R., DuCharme, L., &
Shores, D. (1995).
Stakeholders’ implicit
claims and accounting
method choice. Journal 
of Accounting and
Economics, 20(3), 255-
296.
Burgstahler, D., & Dichev, I.
(1997). Earnings
management to avoid
earnings decreases and
losses. Journal of
Accounting and
Economics, 24(1), 99-
126.
Business Week. (2002,
January 28). Accounting
in crisis: What needs to
be done. Business Week.
Chan, K., Chann, L.,
Jegadeesh, N., &
Lakonishok, L. (2006).
Earnings quality and
stock returns. Journal of
Business, 79, 1041-
1082.
Chen, C. J. P., Chen, S., &
Su, X. (2001).
Profitability regulation,
earnings management
and modified audit
opinions. Auditing, 9, 9-
30.
Chia, M. Y., Lapsley, L., &
Lee, H. (2007). Choice of
auditors and earnings
management during the
Asian financial crisis. 
32 Winter 2010 Southern Business Review
Managerial Auditing
Journal, 22, 77-196.
Christie, A. A. (1990).
Aggregation of test
statistics: An evaluation
of the evidence on
contracting and size
hypotheses. Journal of
Accounting & Economics,
12, 15-36.
Christie, A. A., Joye, M. P.,
& Watts, R. L. (1993). 
Decentralization of the
firm: Theory and
evidence, unpublished
working paper,
University of Rochester,
Rochester, NY.
Chtourou, M. S., & Bedard,
J. (2001). Corporate
Governance and
Earnings Management.
Retrieved from http://
pzapers.ssrn.com/abstr
act=275053. 1-39.
Collins, D., & Hribar, P.
(2002). Errors in
estimating accruals:
implications for
empirical research.
Journal of Accounting
Research, 40(1), 105-
135.
Cotter, J., Stokes, D., &
Wyatt, Z. A. (1998). An
analysis of factors
influencing asset write-
downs. Accounting and
Finance, 38, 157-180.
Coughlan, A. T., & Schmidt,
R. M. (1985). Executive
compensation,
management turnover
and firm performance. 
Journal of Accounting &
Economics, 7, 43-66.
Craswell, A., Francis, J. &
Taylor, S. (1995).
Auditor brand name
reputation and industry
specialisation.  Asian
Review of Accounting,
20(3), 297-322.
Datar, S. M., Feltham, G. A.,
& Hughes, J. S. (1991,
March). The role of
audits and audit quality
in valuing new issues.
Journal of Accounting
and Economics, 3-49.
DeAngelo, L. (1986).
Accounting numbers as
market valuation
substitutes: A study of
management buyouts of
public stockholders. The
Accounting Review, 41,
400-420.
DeAngelo, L. (1988).
Managerial competition,
information costs, and
corporate governance:
The use of accounting
information in proxy
contests. Journal of
Accounting & Economics,
10, 3-36. 
DeAngelo, H., DeAngelo, L.,
& Skinner, D. (1996).
Reversal of fortune:
Dividend signalling and
the disappearance of
sustained earnings
growth. Journal of
Financial Economics, 40,
341-371.
Dechow, P., & Sloan, R. G.
(1991). Executive
incentives and the
horizon problem: An
empirical investigation.
Journal of Accounting &
Economics, 14, 51-89.
Dechow, P., Sloan, R., &
Sweeney, A. (1995).
Detecting earnings
management.  The
Accounting Review, 70,
193-225.
Dechow, P., Sloan, R., &
Sweeney, A. (1996).
Causes and
consequences of
earnings manipulation:
An analysis of firms
subject to enforcement
actions by the SEC.
Contemporary
Accounting Research, 13,
1-36.
DeFond, M. L., &
Subramanyam, K.
(1998). Auditor changes
and discretionary
accruals. Journal of
Accounting & Economics,
2, 35-67.
DeFond, M. L., & Park, C.
W. (1997).  Smoothing
income in anticipation of
future earnings. Journal
of Accounting &
Economics, 23, 115-139.
DeFond, M. L., & Jiambalvo,
J. (1994). Debt covenant
violations and
manipulation of
accruals. Journal of
Accounting & Economics,
17, 145-176.
DeGeorge, F., Patel, J., &
Zeckhauser, R. (1999).
20 Winter 2010 Southern Business Review
during the period in
question. It is further
argued that managers make
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based around current and
expected future per-
formance. Fudenberg and
Torole (1995) suggest that
because incumbency rents
accrue to managers, poor
performance may result in
dismissal, and current
earnings bear more weight
than future earnings,
managers have significant
incentive to shift earnings to
enhance performance and to
make accounting choices to
support their decisions
and/or to create reporting
flexibility for future periods.
These incentives can
cause one of two equal but
opposite outcomes: 1) if
current earnings are low
and perceived future
earnings are high, managers
may choose an accounting
method that will increase
discretionary accruals in
that period (i.e., borrowing
from future earnings); 2) if
current earnings are high,
but expected earnings in the
future are low, managers
may use methods to
decrease the current- year
discretionary accruals (i.e.,
saving current earnings in a
secret reserve, for use in the
future).
Previous research
suggests that current
performance is a deciding
factor, when managers
choose to smooth earnings.
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sufficient important for
managers to create hidden
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income smoothing tactics.
Expectations of competitor
behavior may also be
important determinant of
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management may be more
likely, if it is expected that
competitors will manage
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Some researchers have
argued that the incentive for
income smoothing lies in the
need for job security as
performance is measured by
both current and future
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job security and bad
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possibility of dismissal. In
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seek to borrow from future
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reported performance. The
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but expected future
earnings are low (Defond &
Park, 1997). In other words
some managers save current
earnings against the
possibility of poor perform-
ance in the future. Other
managers, recognizing that
profits cannot rise forever,
create periodic bad years
that are followed by a
succession of good years.
Above-normal gains on
stocks in efficient markets
are theoretically impossible
and such gains require a
performance surprise or
other anomalies. Further,
when stock markets are
undergoing rapid growth,
investors tend to be highly
reliant on analyst forecasts,
for portfolio selections.
These propositions have
encouraged researches over
the past decade, to search
for a relationship between
share prices and the
management of earnings
forecasts that enhance the
opportunity for performance
surprises. Bernhardt and
Campello (2007), examining
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managed analyst forecast
and the associated value
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found a value premium for
firms exceeding their
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earnings forecasts to be
increasingly pessimistic over
the forecast horizon;
suggesting that firms may
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pleasantly surprising the
market. Thus, the reward of
positive earnings-surprises
may be encouraging some
managers to engage in the
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expectations rather either
creating real earnings or the
less sophisticated use CEM.
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CEM Incentives and
Motivations
Chan et el., (2006),
DeGeorge et al., (1999) and
Burgstahler and Dichev
(1997) suggest that changes
in the means and methods
of CEM in different eras flow
with changes in how the
different aspects of reported
earnings are managed in
those eras. In the 1990’s,
CEM literature gained
importance, as the volume
of CEM increased
exponentially. Specifically,
insider trading, a newly
researched CEM
determinant a decade
earlier, became a prominent
explanation for CEM. In the
late 1990s, researchers
began to focus on the
penalties faced by managers
after earnings
manipulations are
discovered. In the early 21st
Century, accounting
standards have become the
main focus of regulatory
bodies and CEM researches
are focusing on how the
theoretical foundations of
earnings management can
be used to strengthen the
use of mandatory disclosure
regulations to enhance
manager awareness of the
risks and the personal
consequences of fraudulent
behavior (Gelinas, 2007).
A three-way information-
asymmetry gradient has
been found between the
managers and the
controlling and non-
controlling investors
(Beneish, 2001); particularly
at the time of initial public
offerings (IPOs). Leland and
Pyle (1977) argue that
prospects for value growth
can be inferred from the
relative amount of equity
retained by insiders. As a
result, a main CEM research
focus of regulatory bodies,
in the past two decades, has
been on equity- and/or
insider-trading. Others
highlight the importance
and role of auditor
reputation on the offer price
(Datar et al., 1991).
Researchers have also
studied the importance of
earnings management in the
context of IPOS and other
research has looked at this
area in the context of
seasoned equity offerings.
Lin et al. (2008),
investigating the effect of the
structure of compensation
committees on CEM and
executive (CEO)
compensation incentives,
found strong evidence that
seasoned, equity-offering
firms engaged in positive
earnings management, to
finance additional capital
(Rangan, 1998;
Shivakumar, 2000). They
also found that CEOs
exercise stock options to
gain profits around
seasoned equity offerings,
when their stock prices are
higher.
Earlier research (e.g.,
Teoh et al., 1998) suggests
that a returns performance
enhanced with CEM will
tend to be negatively
correlated with subsequent
earnings (particularly if
CEM occurred at the time of
a major share issue).
However, research indicates
that market participants do
not fully incorporate the
implications of unexpected
accruals in their valuations.
Thus, it is likely
inappropriate to assert that
intentional CEM at the time
of a security issuance can
be wholly successful in
misleading investors
(Beneish, 2001).
Insider trading is a
relatively new means for
managers to capture the
gains from their CEM
exercises. Beneish (1999
and 2001, p. 10) noted that
“…managers of firms with
earnings overstatements
that violate GAAP are more
likely to sell their stock
appreciation…” Also, his
hypothesis was based on
previous insider trading
research, where he
examined the issue of
manipulation incentives
that are related to insider
trading. It was found that
many managers consider
the provision of timely
insider-information to
investors to be acceptable
and that they (the
managers) should be
rewarded for giving this
service (i.e., by being able to
profit from trading on that
insider information).
Current research suggests
that, if the penalties
imposed on managers
engaging in and/or
facilitating insider trading
are not significant, they will
be seen as more of a tax on
CEM than a deterrent. It
was found, that the U.S.
Securities Exchange
Commission (SEC) was less
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